Reliable data on losses for both sides will most likely become available only after the war ends. Historical experience, including World War II, shows that it may take decades for accurate figures to be declassified.
At present, any specific numbers remain speculative. Official data on one’s own losses are classified, while information on enemy losses is based primarily on operational reports that often contain an element of bias. Assessments by Western intelligence services (British, American, and others) largely rely on Ukrainian sources, although they attempt to adjust them through additional analysis.
Indirect data — such as compensation payments to families of the deceased, OSINT analysis of open sources, confirmed strike videos, and other indicators — provide only a partial picture. Accurately determining the number of irretrievable losses (“200s”) and sanitary losses (“300s”) when striking fortified positions, vehicles, or concentrations of personnel is extremely difficult.
It is important to understand that media references to “British intelligence data” or similar sources are often interpretations or even propaganda that do not always correspond to actual assessments by intelligence agencies. It is advisable to consult primary sources whenever possible.
Approximate Scale of Losses
With a high degree of confidence, it can be stated that total losses on each side number in the hundreds of thousands of personnel killed, wounded, and missing. According to the most widely accepted expert estimates, Russian irretrievable losses (killed in action) are closer to the upper end of this range, while Ukrainian losses are closer to the lower end. Overall irretrievable losses for the Russian side throughout the conflict are estimated by some sources to approach one million when including seriously wounded personnel and those who have permanently left the ranks.
Precise data on seriously wounded soldiers and those who have permanently lost combat capability are also unavailable, but they are likely comparable to the number of fatalities in a roughly 50/50 ratio.
Dynamics of Losses During the War
Initial Period (2022) Russia launched the full-scale invasion with a relatively small force, even taking into account Rosgvardia units and the corps of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Nevertheless, the Russian Armed Forces (RF Armed Forces) held a significant advantage in equipment and firepower. As a result, during the offensive phase, Russian troops suffered fewer losses than the defending Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian army actively used anti-tank weapons and gradually increased its numbers through mobilization.
However, the dispersion of forces across multiple directions and insufficient infantry density led to significant equipment losses (including from Javelin anti-tank systems). The Ukrainian counteroffensive in the autumn of 2022 enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) to liberate large territories and capture substantial amounts of equipment as trophies.
After Mobilization in Russia (Late 2022 – 2023) Following partial mobilization, the Russian army gained a numerical advantage. At the same time, the combat capabilities of the AFU increased thanks to Western supplies. During this period, losses on both sides largely evened out.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive of summer–autumn 2023, conducted with insufficient equipment and ammunition, resulted in relatively high losses for the Ukrainian side.
2024–2026 Gradually, the initiative shifted to Russian forces, which changed their offensive tactics several times — moving from large-scale mechanized assaults to the use of motorcycles and buggies. Currently, the RF Armed Forces have adopted “infiltration” tactics using small groups.
It should be noted that the line of contact (LOC) is not a continuous line of trenches, but a network of strongpoints with gaps between them. Infiltration does not involve the classic occupation and clearing of territory and settlements. Instead, it is a process of infiltration in which there is no clear control over the territory, and the positions of opposing units appear extremely chaotic with no distinct frontline.
Soldiers advance in small groups of as few as two people, often without body armor, bypassing strongpoints and establishing themselves in buildings and bunkers up to 10 km from the LOC, thereby disrupting Ukrainian logistics. Their own logistics are virtually nonexistent — ammunition, radio batteries, food, and water are delivered by air, both in advance and during the accumulation phase at the position.
This tactic allows for local successes but comes at the cost of very high losses, both en route to the objective and during subsequent fighting. Most assault groups suffer significant attrition from mines, drones, and defensive fire. Progress is achieved through the constant replacement of casualties with fresh reinforcements and high personnel losses under conditions of unstable supply. There is virtually no evacuation of the wounded or any serious medical care under this tactic.
Conclusion
As of 2026, exact loss figures remain unknown. However, analysis of the dynamics, tactics, and nature of combat operations allows us to confidently state that Russian army losses substantially exceed Ukrainian losses on most stages of the war after 2022.
The high level of losses is primarily explained by the offensive nature of RF Armed Forces operations and a tactic that does not prioritize the preservation of personnel.
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